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Memory-assisted quantum key distribution (MA-QKD) systems are among novel promising so-
lutions that can improve the key-rate scaling with channel loss. By using a middle node with
quantum storage and measurement functionalities, they offer the same key-rate scaling with dis-
tance as a single-node quantum repeater. However, the distance at which they can surpass the
nominal key rate of repeaterless systems, in terms of bits per second, is typically long, owing to the
efficiency and/or interaction time issues when one deals with quantum memories. This crossover
distance can be a few hundred kilometres, for instance, when one relies on the exchange of infinitely
many key bits for the key-rate analysis. In a realistic setup, however, we should account for the
finite-key effects in our analysis. Here, we show that accounting for such effects would actually favour
MA-QKD setups, by reducing the crossover distance to the regime where realistic implementations
can take place. We demonstrate this by rigorously analysing a decoy-state version of MA-QKD, in
the finite-key regime, using memory parameters already achievable experimentally. This provides
us with a better understanding of the advantages and challenges of working with memory-based
systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has made a lot of progress as part of the solution package for secure communi-
cations in the quantum era. But, when it comes to long distances, quantum technologies still have a long way to go
before they can replicate the same functionalities that public-key cryptography offers. In terrestrial networks, such
as the infrastructure that today’s Internet is based on, the biggest challenge to overcome is perhaps the exponential
growth of loss in optical fibres [1]. This makes it extremely difficult to perform QKD at long distances without trusted
middle nodes. Quantum repeaters are potential solutions, but none of their theoretical architectures can currently be
implemented experimentally to the full effect [2]. For instance, probabilistic quantum repeaters [3–5] would require
quantum memory (QM) modules with high coupling efficiencies to light and with coherence times exceeding the
transmission delays, which are hard to achieve together [6]. That said, even if the current QMs are not sufficiently
advanced for quantum repeaters, they may still be used to offer key-rate improvements in some of the existing QKD
systems. Working on such memory-assisted QKD (MA-QKD) systems paves the way for future scalable quantum
repeaters. This work studies the secret key rate for decoy-state MA-QKD systems in the practical regime where only
a finite block of data is exchanged among QKD users.
MA-QKD setups [6, 7] are based on the measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) protocol [8], in which
Alice and Bob send BB84-encoded pulses to a middle node, Charlie, who performs a Bell-state measurement (BSM).
In MDI-QKD, a raw key bit can be generated if both pulses survive the channel loss in the same round and the BSM
is successful. In MA-QKD, however, Charlie employs two QMs to store the quantum state of the users’ pulses, and
only performs the BSM when both memories have been loaded. This will allow the pulses that arrive in different
rounds to be combined to produce a key bit. Thus, the key-rate scaling is improved from η2 in MDI-QKD to η in
MA-QKD [6], where η is the transmittance of the channel between Alice/Bob and Charlie. Together with the recently
introduced twin-field QKD [9], MA-QKD is a strong contender to beat the current rate versus distance records in
QKD. Such an advantage has recently been demonstrated experimentally using silicon vacancy centres [10].
Offering advantage in a realistic setup that relies on imperfect QMs is not without its own challenges. For instance,
photon-memory coupling can introduce additional loss in the setup. Some memories have also a long photon-memory
interaction time that requires users to employ a low source repetition rate. The better scaling with channel loss
can only offset these effects after a certain distance, which we refer to as the crossover distance. If this distance
happens to be long, it would then be difficult to experimentally implement a stable system that benefits from such an
advantage. Other effects, such as decoherence in the QMs, also need to be taken into account when evaluating system
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2performance [6] and they typically exacerbate the situation. Additionally, in realistic setups, we should consider the
effect of using weak laser pulses by the users in conjunction with finite-key effects. In this work, we develop a security
analysis that accounts for all the above, and, in particular, quantify the interplay between the crossover distance and
other parameters of the system.
Several analyses of MA-QKD have already been carried out, under varying assumptions and for different imple-
mentations of QMs. However, most of them [7, 11, 12] assume single-photon sources, which are difficult to attain
in practice. In many QKD experiments, attenuated laser sources are used, instead. The multi-photon components
in the signals generated by these sources introduce security loopholes, and they need to be dealt with [13]. The
decoy-state method [14] is often used to bound the leaked information from these multi-photon signals, thus closing
the loophole. This method involves the statistical estimation of channel probabilities, based on data collected from
the use of different laser intensities. This statistical characterisation of the channel would only be perfect if one could
collect an infinite amount of data by using the channel infinitely many times. In practice, a QKD experiment will
run for a fixed amount of time, and a finite-size dataset will be generated [15]. By using statistical analyses based on
concentration inequalities, it has been shown that a bound on the leaked information can be computed [15, 16], thus
a secret key can still be distilled, with a failure probability that can be made arbitrarily small. However, as the total
number of signals exchanged (the block size) gets smaller, the obtainable secret key rate is reduced. In fact, if the
block size is too small, no secret key rate may be obtained at all.
In this paper, we provide the first analysis of a decoy-state MA-QKD setup that accounts for the statistical
fluctuations that arise from generating a finite-size key. Previous work [6] on MA-QKD has only considered the
asymptotic limit in which the users exchange an infinite number of signals, and under simplified assumptions on the
loading of QMs with attenuated laser sources. In our finite-key analysis, we compare MA-QKD performance with
that of a no-memory MDI-QKD system, by using parameters from state-of-the-art experiments on quantum memories
[11]. We find that MA-QKD is inherently more resistant to finite-key effects, and it experiences a lower reduction in
secret key rate than MDI-QKD. In particular, we see that once these effects are considered, the distance from which
MA-QKD offers an advantage is reduced. This would make it easier for experimentalists to implement a decoy-state
MA-QKD setup that outperforms, in terms of secret key rate versus distance, the equivalent decoy-state BB84 or
MDI-QKD setups.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we describe the analysed setup, placing an emphasis
on the QM modules, and the different parameters that are used for modelling them. In Section III, we explain how
different system parameters affect the secret-key rate. In Section IV, we compare the secret key rate achievable
in decoy-state MA-QKD and decoy-state MDI-QKD with examples from warm vapour and cold atomic ensembles.
Section V concludes the paper with our interpretation of the results.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe our MA-QKD setup and the assumptions we make on different devices and components
of the system.
Figure 1 shows the schematic of the MA-QKD setup considered in this work. Here, in each round, Alice and Bob
each send decoy-state BB84 states in their chosen basis. Charlie verifies the receipt of the transmitted signal by
generating an entangled photon pair (EPP) on each side to effectively teleport the state of the users to a local photon
on his site. The side BSMs in Fig. 1 would herald the success of such an event, in which case the remaining photon
of the EPP source will be written to the corresponding QM. That is, its photonic state is transferred to the memory,
and will be kept there until the state of the other user is also successfully received and teleported to its respective
QM. At this point, the two QMs will be read, i.e., their states will be transferred to photons on which the middle
BSM is performed. At the end of the protocol, Charlie announces his measurement results, and Alice and Bob would
follow with conventional steps for sifting and post-processing of their key bits.
Note that the teleportation scheme used here to herald and transfer the state of photons is not an ideal one. In
an ideal teleportation setting, the users have to send ideal single photons, whereas here they are using weak laser
pulses. The effect of the multi-photon components has then to be taken into account. We analyse the memory-
loading procedure for weak laser pulses in Appendix A. In this scheme, we are also delaying the writing of the second
photon of the EPP until we learn about the success of teleportation. While there is a chance that the transfer of this
photonic state to the QM may fail, this delayed writing process has the advantage that the QM initialisation is not
necessary in each round [11], but only when a writing procedure has been attempted. This helps with maximising the
repetition rate of the protocol especially when the initialisation phase is time consuming. We account for the failure
in transferring a local single photon to the memory by the memory writing efficiency parameter.
3Figure 1: The schematic of an MA-QKD system. The two users Alice and Bob use decoy-state BB84 encoders to generate
polarisation/phase encoded signals. Charlie, in the middle, uses entangled photon pair (EPP) sources to teleport the state sent
by the users to the corresponding memories. When both memories are loaded, their states are converted back to photons and
combined in the middle BSM. For an example of the BSM module, see Fig. 4 of Appendix A.
Finally, while, in practice, an ideal EPP source as assumed here may not be realistic, it would help us obtain the key
features of our finite-key analysis without overly complicating the calculations. The former issue can be managed by
techniques introduced in Ref. [11], where they propose a quasi-EPP scheme based on single-photon sources, instead.
It is also possible to create a photon-QM entangled pair in certain QMs [12, 17]. In all cases, we should be careful
with the possible multiple excitations we may locally create at Charlie’s node to not violate the conditions for the
proper operation of MA-QKD systems [11, 18]. Under above considerations, we believe that the main result from our
paper, i.e., the resilience of the decoy-state MA-QKD to finite-key effects, should still hold.
In the following, we describe the key components of our system in more detail.
A. Quantum memories
We model QMs using a few relevant parameters to our setup, while keeping our model as general as possible:
• The writing efficiency, denoted as ηw, is the probability of successfully transferring a single-photon state to the
quantum memory. We refer to this process by the term “loading”.
• The reading efficiency, denoted as ηr, is the probability to transfer the qubit state stored in the QM back to a
single photon. We assume that, at time t after loading, ηr(t) = ηr0 exp[−t/T1], where ηr0 denotes the reading
efficiency at time t = 0 and T1 is the decay time constant of the QM.
• The QM decoherence time constant is denoted by T2. We consider two decoherence processes: dephasing and
depolarisation. In the case of dephasing, for an initial state ρ(0) of the QM, the state at a time t after loading
will be
ρ(t) = p(t)ρ(0) + [1− p(t)]σzρ(0)σz, (1)
where p(t) = [1 + exp(−t/T2)]/2. Dephasing will only affect X-basis states. For a depolarisation process, we
assume
ρ(t) = p(t)ρ(0) +
1− p(t)
3
[σzρ(0)σz + σxρ(0)σx + σyρ(0)σy]. (2)
In both cases, we treat the QM state as a qubit for which σx, σy, and σz are its corresponding Pauli operators.
• We denote the interaction time with single photons as τint, for both reading and writing procedures. We denote
the initialisation time of the QM as τinit. Because of our delayed-writing assumption, a writing procedure will
always be followed by a reading procedure, and the QM only needs to be initialised after reading.
• The writing time is denoted as τw, and the reading time is denoted as τr. For our delayed writing procedure, we
assume τw = τint and τr = τint + τinit. We effectively neglect the required time for measurement in both cases.
• We denote as τp the pulse duration of both the user sources and the EPP sources, which are assumed to have
matching pulse shapes. We assume τp = τw to maximize the writing efficiency into the memory. The MA-QKD
system is to be run at a repetition rate of Rs = 1/τp.
4B. Channel and source model
Similarly, we present our assumptions on the channel and the users sources:
• We assume that the user sources produce phase-randomised coherent states, and that the intensity of the pulse
can be perfectly tuned in each round. The users select a random intensity, in terms of mean number of photons,
from the set {z, w1, w2, v} with probability {pz, pw1 , pw2 , pv}. Emissions with the z intensity will be encoded in
the Z basis, and they will be used to generate the raw key. Emissions with any other intensity will be encoded
in the X basis, and they will be used to estimate the single-photon counts and their corresponding phase-error
rate. We will refer to z as the signal intensity, and to {w1, w2, v} as the decoy intensities. Our model can work
with either polarisation or phase encoding. We denote the source repetition rate as Rs.
• We assume non-resolving detectors with efficiency ηd and a dark count rate γdc. The latter includes intrinsic
effects as well as background photons in the channel. The dark count probability per detector per round of the
protocol is pdc = γdcτp.
• We denote the total length of the channel separating Alice and Bob by L. We assume that the central node
is located exactly halfway between the users. We denote the attenuation length of the channel by Latt. The
transmission coefficient for each leg of the channel is given by ηch = exp
(
−L
2Latt
)
.
• We consider the effect of setup misalignment between the user sources and the measurement devices in the
central node. The standard way to model misalignment in QKD is by a misalignment probability emis, and
previous analyses of MA-QKD have also modelled it that way [6]. However, as explained in Appendix A, such a
model is not directly applicable when considering the indirect loading of QMs with weak laser pulses. Here, we
model misalignment by assuming that the encoding modes, e.g., horizontal and vertical polarisations, have been
rotated from their ideal settings by a random angle θ. We then average over θ to find parameters of interest.
• In our setup, we allow for the usage of frequency converters to match the frequency of the telecom signals sent
by the users with that of the EPP source. The EPP source, in one leg, should generate a beam that interacts
with the QM. For a degenerate EPP source, this would typically require us to downconvert the frequency of the
other beam to the telecom band. One can, in principle, design a non-degenerate EPP source, but we should then
be careful with the extent of multiple excitations in the source [18]. We account for the efficiency of frequency
converters by including additional loss in our setup.
III. KEY-RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we find the secret key generation rate for our decoy-state MA-QKD setup, in both the asymptotic
and finite-key regimes. We assume the nominal mode of operation in which no eavesdropper is present, and the system
is only affected by device imperfections. Also, for simplicity, we assume that the sources used by Alice and Bob, and
the channels connecting them to the middle node are identical.
A. Asymptotic case
In this subsection, we calculate the key rate obtainable in the limit that the users exchange an infinite number
of signals. In this regime, we can assume that the signal intensity is used with probability pz ' 1, and that the
decoy-state analysis provides a perfect estimate of the single-photon channel probabilities. Under these assumptions,
the secret key rate is lower bounded by [6]
R ≤ Rs
[
QZ11 (1− h(eph))− fQZh(eZ)
]
, (3)
where QZ is the probability of generating a sifted key bit per round of the protocol, and eZ is the error rate of the
sifted key. Also, QZ11 is the single-photon contribution to QZ , and eph is the phase-error rate of these single-photon
components.
Our objective here is to calculate what Alice and Bob would observe in a nominal experiment for directly measurable
parameters QZ and eZ , and their corresponding estimation for Q
Z
11 and eph after using the decoy state method. For
5this, we mainly use the method introduced in [6], but we adjust it as needed to account for the specific components
of our model. In particular, in the case of weak laser pulses at the source, we need to pay special attention to the
modelling of misalignment in the channel. We also extend the results of [6] to depolarising channels.
Appendix A provides a detailed and self-contained description of our analysis. In short, we first obtain the exact
expression for loading probability pµload and loading error rate e
µ
load when Alice/Bob sends a phase-randomised coherent
state with intensity µ under a generic model for channel misalignment. This parameter would then allow us to calculate
the average number of rounds needed to load both memories, and the corresponding state of the memories after a
heralded loading. We will then account for memory decoherence and decay processes and calculate the rate of success,
and the corresponding error rate, for the middle BSM. Section A 2 a, in Appendix A, provides the analytical form for
all parameters needed in Eq. (3).
B. Finite-key regime
Now, we calculate the secret key rate in the more realistic scenario where the number of signals exchanged by the
users is finite. In this regime, we still derive the secret key from the data points for which both users have used the Z
basis, but we also need to take into account the rounds in which the users employ decoy intensities. In this case, we
can no longer assume that the decoy-state analysis provides a perfect estimate of the single-photon statistics QZ11 and
eph. Instead, we use a statistical analysis to bound them. Under our new assumptions, the total secret key length K
satisfies
K ≥MZ11[1−H(eph)]−MZH(eZ), (4)
where MZ is the length of the sifted key, generated from the events in which both users selected the Z basis (i.e., the
z intensity), and eZ is its bit error rate; M
Z
11 is the number of bits in this sifted key that originated from single-photon
emissions, and eph is their phase-error rate.
In an experimental implementation of the protocol, the measurable observables available to us are the sets {Mab}
and {Eab}, where Mab is the total number of measurement counts when Alice has used intensity a and Bob has used
intensity b, while Eab is the number of such events that result in error. The objective of Alice and Bob is to use this
data to obtain statistical bounds on MZ11 and eph.
The full description of our statistical analysis appears in Appendix B. We use the idea in [19] to perform our
statistical fluctuation analysis using X-basis data only. This would make our statistical estimation procedure more
efficient. By applying tight multiplicative Chernoff bounds [15], we are then able to use the measured counts Mab
and Eab to set linear constraints on the possible values that MZ11 and eph could take. These constraints enable us
to express the desired bounds on these quantities as the solution to two linear programs. We use the analytical
estimation procedure introduced in [16] to solve these programs.
For our numerical simulations, we still need to make some assumptions on the obtained measurement results in a
nominal experiment. For this purpose, we use the expected values for relevant parameters using the corresponding
probability in the asymptotic regime, derived in the previous subsection. That is, we assume
Mab = NQab and Eab = eabM
ab, (5)
where N is the total number of rounds, i.e., the number of transmitted pulses by Alice/Bob, in the protocol, Qab is
the probability of having a successful measurement originating from intensities a, for Alice, and b, for Bob, and eab is
the probability that this measurement results in an error. Section A 2 b, in Appendix A, provides the derivation and
the analytical form for all these parameters.
Finally, we note that in our key rate formula in Eq. (4), we have neglected some of the less significant terms that
usually appear in a rigorous finite-key analysis. The latter is to adhere to the universal composable framework [20, 21];
e.g., we direct the reader to Eq. (1) of [16]. We have neglected these terms for simplicity, as they are, in practice,
only on the order of tens of bits and because their effect is identical for the memory-assisted and no-memory systems,
which the present work aims to compare.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we use the results of Section III to simulate the secret key rate that can be achieved with the
decoy-state MA-QKD scheme in Fig. 1, in both the asymptotic and finite-key regimes. We use two types of memories
6for our analysis: Warm vapour atomic ensembles, which often offer high bandwidth, hence high repetition rates, but a
rather low coherence time; and cold atomic ensembles, which are often slower but benefit from longer coherence times.
Table I summarises the relevant memory parameters used in our simulation based on the experimentally reported
values in [22], for warm vapours, and [23], for cold atomic ensembles. In our simulations, we have assumed T1 = T2.
WV [22] CA [23]
Writing-reading efficiency, ηwηr0 0.05 0.76
Decay time, T1 120 µs 220 ms
Interaction time, τint 1.43 ns 240 ns
Repetition rate, Rs 518 MHz 4.2 MHz
Table I: Parameter values of recently demonstrated warm vapour (WV) and cold atom (CA) ensembles [11], used in the
simulations in this work. For simplicity, in our simulations, we assume T2 = T1.
We compare the MA-QKD system with a no-memory MDI-QKD setup, run at a repetition rate of 1 GHz, as a
reference point, and study how finite-key effects change the crossover distance under different circumstances. Section
A 3 in Appendix A provides the analytical expressions used for simulating the MDI-QKD system. MDI-QKD is the
closest no-QM system to MA-QKD, which enables us to make this comparison as fair as possible. They both offer
measurement-device-independent features and they can both be run with minimal requirements on the source or
channel phase stabilisation. The latter property is needed for advanced twin-field QKD systems, whose rate-versus-
distance scaling is similar to MA-QKD, but are expected to offer higher rates if properly implemented [24–26].
In all cases, we use the system parameters listed in Table II, which are attainable by today’s technologies. In all
graphs, we optimise over the values of the intensities {z, w1, w2}, and assume a vacuum intensity of v = 0.5·10−3, since
the optimal value v = 0 may be difficult to achieve in practice. We also optimise over their selection probabilities
{pz, pw1 , pw2 , pv}. In our finite-key analysis, we assume a failure probability of ε = 0.5 · 10−11 for each of the
concentration bounds used in Appendix B; the total failure probability of the estimation process is 20ε = 10−10.
Attenuation length of the channel, Latt 17.3 km
Detector efficiency, ηd 93%
Detector dark count rate, γdc 1 count/s
Misalignment error probability, emis 0.5%
Table II: System parameter values used for the simulations in this work. For no-memory MDI-QKD, we assume that the channel
misalignment, in their respective leg of the channel, flips the state sent by each user with probability emis. For MA-QKD, we
assume that channel misalignment rotates the states sent by the users by an angle θ that follows a uniform distribution of
width 2
√
3emis; see Eq. (A23), and the explanation preceding it.
In Fig. 2, we show the performance of the warm vapour memory in Ref. [22], for different values of the block size
N , which represents the total number of signals sent by Alice (or Bob) in that run of the protocol. In Fig. 2(a), we
can see that in the asymptotic regime (black curves), the MA-QKD protocol can only offer a small advantage over
MDI-QKD from around 340 km to 430 km. However, once we use a finite block size N (colour curves), the crossover
distance moves to the left to shorter channel lengths, and even approaches 100 km at N = 1010. This suggests that in
order to see the advantages of MA-QKD over no-QM MDI-QKD we only need to demonstrate such systems over much
shorter distances than one may require in the asymptotic regime. With record distances for entanglement distribution
between two QMs being around 50 km [27], one can hope that such a demonstration can take place in near future.
While a slight shift to the left, due to finite-key effects, might be expected in Fig. 2, the considerable change in
the crossover distance may come as a surprise. A naive thinking may suggest that in order to see the benefits in the
finite-key setting, we need to have larger count numbers in MA-QKD, as compared to MDI-QKD, to reduce statistical
errors in our parameter estimation. But, so long as, in the asymptotic case, the key rate for MDI-QKD is higher
than that of MA-QKD, we may expect that the corresponding counts will also remain larger in the finite-key setting,
hence no considerable change may be expected in the crossover distance. This argument, however, fails to give us an
accurate picture of what is happening in the MA-QKD case. Below, we explain two key reasons for why the finite-key
setting may benefit the MA-QKD setup, hence shifting the crossover distance to much shorter channel lengths.
• Self-purification of multi-photon terms: The MA-QKD system can by design get rid of some of the
erroneous terms that would otherwise be present in the no-QM setup. Let us compare the two setups when
Alice selects a non-vacuum intensity s, in the X basis, and Bob selects the vacuum intensity v. In no-QM MDI-
QKD, there is a single BSM module, in which Alice’s and Bob’s emissions are directly combined. A successful
BSM, in polarisation encoding, is declared if two detectors corresponding to different polarisations click. In the
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Figure 2: Secret key generation rate, in b/s, for an MA-QKD setup using warm vapour quantum memories [22] (solid lines),
in comparison with no-memory MDI-QKD (dashed lines), for different values of the block size N . In (a) and (c) a dephasing
channel is used to model memory decoherence, whereas, in (b), a depolarisation channel is used. The efficiency of the frequency
converter is assumed ideal in (a) and (b), whereas, in (c), it is 50%.
event that Bob sends a vacuum state, a successful BSM could happen because of the multi-photon terms in
Alice’s signal. This increases Msv and Esv counts, which add to the uncertainty in estimating eph. In MA-QKD,
such counts are much lower. Charlie will declare that Bob’s QM has been loaded when his corresponding side
BSM is successful. For a vacuum input, such an event could only happen if one of the detectors clicks because of
the dark count, assuming that the EPP source can only cause a click in one of the detectors. For low dark count
rates, as we assume here, the measurement counts Msv, as well as its corresponding terms in error will be close
to zero in MA-QKD. Around the crossover distance, this makes the upper bound on eph lower for MA-QKD
even if its corresponding value in the asymptotic case is higher than that of MDI-QKD. That is, MA-QKD
enjoys less noisy statistics that helps us obtain tighter bounds on our parameters of interest.
• Efficient use of decoy states: In both MDI-QKD and MA-QKD, the secret key is extracted from events in
which both users select the signal intensity z. The rounds in which they both employ the decoy intensities are
used for parameter estimation only. The points that one user uses the Z basis and the other uses the X basis,
are then somehow “wasted” and will be sifted out. MA-QKD can help with better sifting efficiency. This is
partly because of the main advantage of MA-QKD with respect to MDI-QKD in that the key rate scales with
the transmissivity of one leg of the channel, rather than the entire channel. To better understand this point,
let us consider the effect of employing the vacuum intensity, v. Suppose that Alice and Bob are using either
an MDI-QKD or an MA-QKD setup with a channel transmittance per leg of η, and that they use intensity z
with probability pz ' 1, as they do in the infinite key regime. Charlie will report a successful detection with
probability Qz. Now suppose that they use the same scheme as above, except that they now employ a (fictitious)
finite-key scheme, in which they employ the vacuum intensity v with probability pv = pz = 1/2. The effect of
this is equivalent to using a channel with transmittance per leg of η/2, since the effective transmittance of each
user’s link has been reduced by one half. Since MDI-QKD scales with η2, Qz will be reduced by a factor of
4. However, since MA-QKD scales with η, Qz will only be reduced by a factor of 2. In reality, Alice and Bob
will use additional decoy intensities other than the vacuum intensity. But since the decoy states will typically
have larger vacuum components than the signal intensity z, they will have a similar effect as adding loss to the
system, which MA-QKD tolerates better.
Another important factor in our finite-key comparison is the amount of time needed to collect data for a block size
N . In the case of MDI-QKD, we can typically run the system at a high repetition rate on the order of GHz for very
long periods of time. The stability of the memory-based system may, however, require us to stop collecting data after
a certain period of time. It would be interesting to see how the two systems compare if, instead of the block size, one
fixes the total data collection time Tcol, instead. This corresponds to a block size of N = RsTcol, for each system,
and gives a considerable advantage to the faster system in collecting more data at an identical time. This would not
make much a difference in the case of warm vapours as we can already run the system at sub-GHz rates. But, in the
case of cold atomic ensembles, which represent slower memories, this would be interesting to study.
Figure 3 shows the performance of MA-QKD using the cold atom QM reported in Ref. [23], with a repetition rate
of 4.2 MHz, at different collection times. This means that, at an identical collection time, the MDI-QKD system can
collect almost 250 times more data than the MA-QKD setup. It is interesting to see that, even under these harsher
conditions, the MA-QKD system can offer a similar advantage as we saw in Fig. 2 over the no-QM MDI-QKD setup.
As shown in Fig. 3(a), for a dephasing channel, in the asymptotic regime (black curves), the MA-QKD system can
only offer a small advantage in the range from 300 km to 430 km. However, if the experiment is run for an hour (orange
curves), MA-QKD can generate more key after 230 km, and, while MDI-QKD dies off at about 250 km, MA-QKD
8can generate a key up to 350 km. If the experiment is run for just a minute (blue curves), MA-QKD can offer an
advantage after a distance of just 170 km.
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Figure 3: Secret key generation rate, in b/s, for an MA-QKD setup using cold atom quantum memories (solid lines) reported
in [23], in comparison with no-memory MDI-QKD (dashed lines), if we collect data for one minute (blue), one hour (orange),
or with no time limit (black). In (a) and (c) a dephasing channel is used to model memory decoherence, whereas, in (b), a
depolarisation channel is used. The efficiency of the frequency converter is assumed ideal in (a) and (b), whereas, in (c), it is
50%.
Finally, we have looked at how different system parameters can affect the conclusion we draw above. In Fig. 2(b)
and Fig. 3(b), we have used a depolarising channel to model the decoherence effect. In comparison to Fig. 2(a) and
Fig. 3(a), where a dephasing model is used, we see that the warm vapour system, which has lower T2 values, is
more adversely affected than the cold atom system. We observe the same behaviour when we change the frequency
converter efficiency from one to to 0.5 as can be seen in Fig. 2(c) and Fig. 3(c). This can simply be a ramification of
having noisier data in the case of warm vapours as compared to the cold atom case. This would result in less tight
bounds on system parameters at the same block size or collection time, hence sharper drop in key rates. The overall
effect would nevertheless suggest that MA-QKD systems can offer competitive performances in the finite-key regime
irrespective of the memory or other relevant system parameters. This would be an essential observation in the early
demonstrations of memory-based systems and how we benchmark them against their rival counterparts.
V. CONCLUSIONS
By borrowing ideas from quantum repeaters, MA-QKD can improve the scaling of repeaterless QKD systems.
However, the common imperfections in memory-based systems such as their coupling efficiency to photonic systems,
or their finite coherence times, may make it difficult for them to offer any practical advantage as compared to their
no-memory counterparts. In particular, previous analyses suggest that any advantage in the total key rate would
often come only after a crossover distance that is still challenging to implement experimentally. In this work, we
showed that once we considered the finite-key effects in the key rate analysis, the crossover distance in such systems
was reduced to a point that an experimental implementation can be foreseen in the near future. This effect was
attributed to two features of MA-QKD systems. First is their ability to purify some of the errors that result from
multi-photon terms in weak laser pulses, and the other relates to a more efficient sifting of signal and decoy states. It
is essential, however, for MA-QKD systems to keep all sources of noise near the memory units low, as they otherwise
would translate into erroneous measurements in the middle site. As such are the multiple excitation terms in the
memories, or sources that drive them, or additional background noise that may enter the setup. All these issues are
manageable with careful design and they are all precursors to implementing longer quantum communications links
relying on quantum memory units.
We should note that there are no-memory QKD systems, such as twin-field (TF) QKD [9], that offer a similar
rate-vs-distance scaling as MA-QKD, and they have already been implemented at record distances [26]. An MA-
QKD system may not be currently able to offer higher key rates or reach longer distances than those achieved by
TF-QKD systems. But, it is important to recognise that the expertise and skills in both MA-QKD and TF-QKD
would be required to implement scalable quantum repeater systems that go beyond the current rate-versus-distance
records. In this respect, this work makes us one step closer to the final goal of implementing long-distance quantum
communications systems.
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Appendix A: Simulation model
In this appendix, we describe our simulation model, starting with our analysis of the indirect-loading of QMs with
attenuated laser sources. Here, we assume that Charlie is honest, there is no eavesdropper, and we are only interested
in finding the relevant parameters in a realistic setting.
50:50
BS
PBS PBS
EPP QM
D1H
D1V
D2H
D2V
Decoy
source
BSM
m
Butterfly module
Figure 4: Loading of a QM with a Z-encoded weak coherent pulse, in a round with a misalignment angle of θ. The module in
the dotted box represents a partial Bell-state measurement (BSM) on polarisation-encoded photons. We refer to the module
in the dashed box as the butterfly module, in which ηa models the channel transmissivity and the quantum efficiency of a
single-photon detector, whereas ηb captures the coupling and frequency conversion efficiencies as well as the quantum efficiency
of a single-photon detector. The quantum efficiency of photodetectors in the BSM module is then assumed to be one.
Figure 4 shows a schematic view of our memory loading model for a single user, say Alice, in the polarisation
encoding case. We model the loss in the channel, the measurement devices, and possible frequency converters as two
beam splitters of transmissivity ηa = ηchηd and ηb = ηcηd located at each input port of the 50:50 beam splitter of the
BSM module. Here, ηch models the transmissivity of the Alice-Charlie channel, ηc models the frequency conversion
and/or coupling efficiency, and ηd represents the efficiency of the single-photon detectors. Note that by assuming the
same efficiency ηd for all detectors, we are able to analyse its effects at the input ports of the BSM, simplifying our
model. We do not need to consider the effect of the QM’s writing efficiency, ηw, at the loading stage. Instead, we
modify the reading efficiency ηr by an ηw factor, allowing us to analyse its effect at the reading stage. In Fig. 4,
the EPP source is assumed to generate an ideal entangled state in the form 1√
2
(|HH〉bˆmˆ + |V V 〉bˆmˆ), where bˆ and mˆ,
respectively, represent the two output modes of the EPP source heading toward the BSM module and the QM.
We also consider setup misalignment between the user sources and the central node, which, in polarisation encoding,
we model as a random rotation of the horizontal and vertical modes. For simplicity, we assume that the rotation
angle θ is independent and identically distributed between different rounds of the protocol, and for the two legs of
the system. Also, we assume that polarisation maintenance schemes are in place, so that the reference frames at the
user sources and the central node are the same on average. It is reasonable then to assume, as we do in this work,
that the probability density function (PDF) f(θ) is an even function of θ. One can use a similar formulation when
other types of encoding, e.g. time-bin, are used.
In the following, in Sec. A 1, we first find the post-measurement state of the loaded memory, the loading probability,
and the its corresponding error rate under above considerations. The particular issue of misalignment turns out to
complicate the analysis when we use weak laser pulses (WCPs) as compared to single-photon sources. Previous
analyses of MA-QKD either assume no channel misalignment [7, 11] or model it as an error probability emis [6, 18],
which is effectively given by
∫ pi
−pi f(θ) sin
2(θ)dθ. In our case, while the analysis is more cumbersome, the end result,
in terms of the form of the post-measurement state of the QM, is similar to the single-photon case. This allows us to
replicate most of the analysis in [6] in Sec. A 2, and extend it to the case of depolarisation channels. In the last section
of this Appendix, we have summarised the key rate relationships used for the no-QM MDI-QKD as a reference point.
1. Memory loading
Here, we calculate the post-measurement state of the QM, its loading probability and error rate, in the two cases
of Z and X bases.
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a. Analysis for Z basis
Without loss of generality, let us consider the case that the user generates a horizontally polarised WCP of intensity
µ. Ideally, the state generated is of the form |α〉aˆh |0〉aˆv , where α =
√
µ and aˆh and aˆv represent, respectively, the
horizontal and vertical modes of the transmitted light in Fig. 4. In a particular round with a misalignment angle of
θ, the misaligned state, at the input of the butterfly module, is given by
|ψ〉θaˆ = |αh〉aˆh |αv〉aˆv , (A1)
where αh = α cos θ and αv = α sin θ. Meanwhile, the joint state of the two output modes of the EPP source, i.e., bˆ
and mˆ, is given by ∣∣Φ+〉
bˆmˆ
= 1√
2
(|HH〉bˆmˆ + |V V 〉bˆmˆ) = 1√2 (|10H〉bˆhbˆvmˆ + |01V 〉bˆhbˆvmˆ), (A2)
where in the last equality, we have divided bˆ into, respectively, horizontal and vertical modes bˆh and bˆv. After
reordering modes, and averaging over θ, the joint input state to the butterfly module is given by
ρˆin =
∫ pi
−pi
f(θ)ρˆθindθ, (A3)
where
ρˆθin = |ψ〉θaˆ〈ψ| ⊗
∣∣Φ+〉
bˆmˆ
〈
Φ+
∣∣ = 1
2
|αh〉〈αh|aˆh |1〉〈1|bˆh |αv〉〈αv|aˆv |0〉〈0|bˆv |H〉〈H|mˆ
+
1
2
|αh〉〈αh|aˆh |0〉〈0|bˆh |αv〉〈αv|aˆv |1〉〈1|bˆv |V 〉〈V |mˆ
+
1
2
|αh〉〈αh|aˆh |1〉〈0|bˆh |αv〉〈αv|aˆv |0〉〈1|bˆv |H〉〈V |mˆ
+
1
2
|αh〉〈αh|aˆh |0〉〈1|bˆh |αv〉〈αv|aˆv |1〉〈0|bˆv |V 〉〈H|mˆ ,
(A4)
and |ψ〉 〈ψ|aˆ is our shorthand notation for |ψ〉aˆaˆ〈ψ|.
We are interested in the state projected to the QM after a successful loading, i.e., when exactly an H detector
and a V detector click in the BSM module. To model this measurement process, we should find the output state of
the butterfly module, with an input state as in Eq. (A3), and then find the post-measurement state for the desired
measurement outcome. The key to calculate this is to realise that the horizontal and vertical modes will interact
separately at the 50:50 beam splitter of the butterfly module, and will cause clicks in the horizontal and vertically
polarised detectors, respectively. Thus, we can split the overall transformation Bˆ for the butterfly module in Fig. 4,
and the overall POVM operator Mˆ in horizontal and vertical operators as follows:
Bˆ = Bˆh ⊗ Bˆv (A5)
Mˆ = Mˆh ⊗ Mˆv. (A6)
Here, the butterfly operators Bˆh and Bˆv in Fig. 4 only differ in their input and output modes: Bˆh will take modes
aˆh and bˆh to modes lˆh and rˆh, while Bˆv will take modes aˆv and bˆv to modes lˆv and rˆv. The measurement operators
(POVMs) are also identical for both the horizontal and vertical modes, and are given by
Mˆx = (1− pdc)
[(
Iˆlˆx − (1− pdc) |0〉〈0|lˆx
)
⊗ |0〉〈0|rˆx
]
+ (1− pdc)
[
|0〉〈0|lˆx ⊗
(
Iˆrˆx − (1− pdc) |0〉〈0|rˆx
)]
,
(A7)
for x ∈ {h, v}, where Iˆ is the identity operator for the corresponding mode. Mˆx represents the event of getting a click
in the x-polarised left detector and no click on the x-polarised right detector, or vice-versa.
Using the above notation, the post-measurement state of the QM, after a successful loading, is given by
ρˆmˆ =
Trlˆh,lˆv,rˆhrˆv
[
B†ρˆinBM
]
Tr
[
Bˆ†ρˆinBˆMˆ
] = 1
pµload
∫ pi
−pi
f(θ)Trlˆh,lˆv,rˆhrˆv
[
B†ρˆθinBM
]
dθ (A8)
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where
Trlˆh,lˆv,rˆhrˆv
[
B†ρˆθinBM
]
= cHH(θ) |H〉〈H|+ cV V (θ) |V 〉〈V |+ cHV (θ) |H〉〈V |+ cV H(θ) |V 〉〈H| , (A9)
with
cHH(θ) =
1
2
Tr
[
B†
hˆ
|αh〉〈αh|aˆh |1〉〈1|bˆh BhˆMhˆ
]
Tr
[
B†vˆ |αv〉〈αv|aˆv |0〉〈0|bˆv BvˆMvˆ
]
cV V (θ) =
1
2
Tr
[
B†
hˆ
|αh〉〈αh|aˆh |0〉〈0|bˆh BhˆMhˆ
]
Tr
[
B†vˆ |αv〉〈αv|aˆv |1〉〈1|bˆv BvˆMvˆ
]
cHV (θ) =
1
2
Tr
[
B†
hˆ
|αh〉〈αh|aˆh |1〉〈0|bˆh BhˆMhˆ
]
Tr
[
B†vˆ |αv〉〈αv|aˆv |0〉〈1|bˆv BvˆMvˆ
]
cV H(θ) =
1
2
Tr
[
B†
hˆ
|αh〉〈αh|aˆh |0〉〈1|bˆh BhˆMhˆ
]
Tr
[
B†vˆ |αv〉〈αv|aˆv |1〉〈0|bˆv BvˆMvˆ
]
,
(A10)
and
pµload = Tr
[
Bˆ†ρˆinBˆMˆ
]
=
∫ pi
−pi
f(θ)[cHH(θ) + cV V (θ)]dθ (A11)
is the probability of a successful loading for a WCP with intensity µ.
Every individual trace term in Eq. (A10) involves either horizontal or vertical modes, and is equivalent to the
probability of having exactly one detector click in the corresponding polarisation. Such terms have already been
calculated in Table III of [28], which here we reuse, after making necessary adjustments, to obtain
cHH(θ) = (1− pdc)2
(
1− e−1/2 ηa (sin2 θ)µ (1− pdc)
)
×((
ηb
(
cos2 θ
)
µ ηa − 2 ηb + 4
)
e1/2 ηa (cos
2 θ)µ − 4 (1− ηb) (1− pdc)
)
e−1/2 ηa µ ((cos
2 θ)+1),
cV V (θ) = (1− pdc)2
[
(1− pdc)
(
ηb cos
2 θµ ηa − ηb ηa µ+ 2 ηb − 4
)
e−1/2 ηa µ (cos
2 θ+1)
− 4 (1− ηb) (1− pdc) e1/2 ηa µ (cos
2 θ−2) − (ηb cos2 θµ ηa − ηb ηa µ+ 2 ηb − 4) e−1/2 ηa µ
+ 4 e−ηa µ (−1 + pdc)2 (1− ηb)
]
,
(A12)
and
cHV (θ) = cV H(θ) =
1
4
cos θ sin θ(1− pdc)2(ηaηbµe−ηaµ). (A13)
It is interesting that, in the above, the diagonal terms cHV and cV H are odd functions of θ. Under our assumption
that f(θ) is an even function, we have that∫ pi
−pi
f(θ)cHV (θ)dθ =
∫ pi
−pi
f(θ)cV H(θ)dθ = 0, (A14)
implying that these terms vanish when considering the average post-measurement state ρˆmˆ in Eq. (A8). Thus, ρˆmˆ
can be expressed as
ρmˆ = e
µ
load |H〉〈H|+ (1− eµload) |V 〉〈V | , (A15)
where
eµload =
1
pµload
∫ pi
−pi
f(θ)cHH(θ)dθ (A16)
is the probability of loading the memory with the wrong state. In our case, when we send H-polarised light, a
successful BSM in Fig. 4 suggests that the bˆ mode is V-polarised. The state stored in the memory, for an EPP source
with |Φ+〉bˆmˆ as its initial state, is then also expected to be V-polarised. That is why the coefficient for |H〉〈H|, in
Eq. (A15), represents the loading error probability, in Z basis, for a WCP with intensity µ.
Due to the symmetry of the setup, if the user sends vertically polarised light, the loading probability pµload would
be the same, but the post-measurement state is given by ρmˆ = (1− eµload) |H〉〈H|+ eµload |V 〉〈V |.
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b. Analysis for X basis
Without loss of generality, let us assume that Alice generates the plus state given by∣∣∣∣ α√2
〉
aˆh
∣∣∣∣ α√2
〉
aˆv
. (A17)
In a particular round with a misalignment angle θ, the butterfly module will receive the state
|ψ〉θaˆ =
∣∣∣∣ α√2(sin θ + cos θ)
〉
aˆh
∣∣∣∣ α√2(sin θ − cos θ)
〉
aˆv
, (A18)
while the output state of the EPP source can be written as∣∣Φ+〉
bˆmˆ
= 1√
2
(|DD〉bˆmˆ + |AA〉bˆmˆ) = 1√2 ((|10〉+ |01〉) |D〉+ (|10〉 − |01〉) |A〉))bˆhbˆvmˆ , (A19)
where |D〉 = (|H〉+ |V 〉)/√2 and |A〉 = (|H〉 − |V 〉)/√2.
The analysis is similar to the one for the Z basis. After going through similar steps, we find that the probability
to successfully load the memory is given by
pµload =
∫ pi
−pi
f(θ)
1
2
(1− pdc)2
(
(1− pdc) (cos θ sin (θ)µηa ηb − 1/2 ηb µηa + 6 ηb − 8) e−1/2 ηa µ(cos θ sin(θ)+3/2)
− (1− pdc) (cos θ sin (θ)µηa ηb + 1/2 ηb µηa − 6 ηb + 8) e1/4 ηa µ(2 cos(θ) sin(θ)−3)
+ (ηb µηa − 4 ηb + 8) e−1/2 ηa µ + 8 e−ηa µ (1− pdc)2 (1− ηb)
)
dθ,
(A20)
and, under our assumption that f(θ) is even, the post-measurement state of the memory can be written as
ρmˆ = e
µ
load |D〉〈D|+ (1− eµload) |A〉〈A| , (A21)
where
eµload =
1
pµload
∫ pi
−pi
f(θ)
1
4
(−1 + pdc)2
(
(1− pdc) (cos (θ) sin (θ)µηa ηb − 1/2 ηb µηa + 6 ηb − 8) e−1/2 ηa µ(cos(θ) sin(θ)+3/2)
− (1− pdc) (cos (θ) sin (θ)µηa ηb + 1/2 ηb µηa − 6 ηb + 8) e1/4 ηa µ(2 cos(θ) sin(θ)−3)
+
(
2 ηb µηa − 2
(
cos2 θ
)
µηa ηb − 4 ηb + 8
)
e−1/2 ηa µ + 8 e−ηa µ (1− pdc)2 (1− ηb)
)
dθ.
(A22)
Finally, note that we calculate the integrals in Eqs. (A11), (A16), (A20) and (A22) numerically as a closed form
expression for them could not be found. In our simulations, to compute pµload and e
µ
load, we assume that f(θ) follows
a uniform distribution over [−Θ,Θ]. To have a fair comparison with no-memory MDI-QKD, we choose Θ = √3emis,
where emis is the misalignment error probability in one leg of a symmetric MDI-QKD setup. This is motivated by the
fact that
1
2
√
3emis
∫ √3emis
−√3emis
sin2 θdθ ≈ 1
2
√
3emis
∫ √3emis
−√3emis
θ2dθ = emis, (A23)
which implies that the chosen f(θ) would cause a misalignment error of approximately emis in the MDI-QKD setup.
2. Key rate simulation
In Sec. A 1, we showed that the post-measurement QM state after a successful loading is a mixture of the desired
and undesired states for the QM; see Eq. (A15) and Eq. (A21). In effect, it is as if the state of QM has flipped with
a probability eµload. This is similar to how misalignment acts on a single photon state, because of which we can think
of the whole loading process as a channel with an effective misalignment of eµload. This would also make it possible
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to use the methodology in Ref. [6] to calculate the required parameters of the key rate formula. In particular, the
photonic states retrieved from the two QMs turn out to also have a similar form to a misaligned photon, although at
a higher error rate to account for the dephasing/depolarisation process.
In the following, we explain how to simulate all terms in the key-rate formula, in both the asymptotic and finite-key
regimes. Given that in MA-QKD, one of the memories will be read immediately after loading, only one of the QMs
would undergo the decay process. That implies that the middle BSM in Fig. 1 can be thought as an asymmetric
MDI-QKD setup, with possibly different transmissivities ηl and ηr for, respectively, its left and right legs [6]. We can
then use the yield and error rate formulas, summarised below, of asymmetric single-photon MDI-QKD for our rate
calculation:
Y MDI11 (ηl, ηr) = (1− pd)2
[ηlηr
2
+ (2ηl + 2ηr − 3ηlηr)pd + 4(1− ηl)(1− ηr)p2d
]
, (A24)
eMDI11;X(ηl, ηr, ed)Y
MDI
11 (ηl, ηr) = e0Y
MDI
11 (ηl, ηr)− (e0 − ed)(1− pd)2ηlηr/2, (A25)
eMDI11;Z(ηl, ηr, ed)Y
MDI
11 (ηl, ηr) = e0Y
MDI
11 (ηl, ηr)− (e0 − ed)(1− pd)2(1− 2pd)ηlηr/2, (A26)
where e0 = 1/2 and ed is the total misalignment probability in the asymmetric MDI-QKD setup, i.e., the probability
that exactly one of the photons is misaligned.
a. Asymptotic regime
In this case, the key-rate formula is given by Eq. (3). In this regime, we assume that the signal intensity z, encoded
in the Z-basis, is chosen with probability approaching one, and the parameter estimation provides perfect estimates of
the single-photon terms QZ11 and eph. We only then need to simulate the values of QZ , eZ , Q
Z
11 and eph under nominal
mode of operation. The procedure we use to calculate these terms is very similar to that of [6]. The main differences
are our new model for the memory-loading with WCPs, developed earlier in this Appendix, and the inclusion of the
depolarising channel for memory decoherence.
To compute QZ , we divide it into two parts: (1) the probability of having the two memories loaded and available
to read in a given round, denoted by Pside, and (2) the probability that the middle BSM is successful, given that the
QMs are ready, denoted by Pmid. Then,
QZ = PsidePmid. (A27)
To find Pside, we first estimate the probability to load the QM with a Z-encoded WCP, given by p
z
load in Eq. (A11).
Then, we compute the average number of rounds NL that it takes to load both memories, substituting ηA and ηB by
pzload in Eq. (C.3) of [6], to obtain
NL =
3− 2pzload
pzload(2− pzload)
. (A28)
Then, we have that
Pside =
1
NL +Nr
. (A29)
where Nr is the number of rounds it takes to read the memory, which we assume to be one.
The second term is given by
Pmid = Y
MDI
11 (ηm, ηm′), (A30)
where ηm = ηwηr0ηd is the effective reading efficiency of the QM loaded later, and ηm′ is the average effective reading
efficiency of the QM loaded earlier, given by [6]
ηm′ =
(1 + eT/T1 − pzload)pzload
(2− pzload)(eT/T1 + pzload − 1)
ηm, (A31)
where T1 is the time constant for the decay process of the QM.
The single-photon component QZ11 is given by
QZ11 = QZ
(pSPload)
2
(pzload)
2
z2e−2z, (A32)
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where pSPload is the probability to load the QM when a single photon is sent, given by [6]
pSPload = Y
MDI
11 (ηchηd, ηcηd). (A33)
To find eph, we first calculate the misalignment-error probability for loading the QM with an X-basis single photon,
which is given by [6]
eX,SPload = e
MDI
11;X(ηchηd, ηcηd, emis). (A34)
Then, we obtain
eph = e
MDI
11;X(ηm, η
′
m,E
{
eSPQM
}
), (A35)
where E
{
eSPQM
}
is the total misalignment probability, given by
E
{
eSPQM
}
= 2eX,SPload + 2βE {edeph} − 2eX,SPload eX,SPload − 4βE {edeph} eX,SPload , (A36)
with
E {edeph} = 1− p
z
load
1− (1− pzload)2
− (p
z
load)
2(1− pzloade−T/T2)
[1− (1− pzload)e−T/T2 ][1− (1− pzload)2]
, (A37)
in the case of dephasing memories, and by
E
{
eSPQM
}
= 2eX,SPload + 2βE {edepol} − 2eX,SPload eX,SPload − 4βE {edepol} eX,SPload , (A38)
with
E {edepol} = 2
3
E {edeph} , (A39)
in the case of depolarising memories.
To calculate eZ , we use
eZ = e
MDI
11;Z(ηm, η
′
m,E {eQM}), (A40)
where E {eQM} is the average total misalignment-error probability between the two QMs, which depends on the
specific model used for decoherence. In the dephasing model, the Z-basis QM states will not be affected by the
decoherence, therefore, the probability that exactly one state is misaligned is as follows
E {eQM} = eQM = 2ezload(1− ezload), (A41)
where ezload is given by Eq. (A16). For the depolarisation model, we have
E {eQM} = 2ezload + 2βE {edepol} − 2ezloadezload − 4βE {edepol} ezload, (A42)
where β = 1− 2ezload.
To derive Eq. (A42) and Eqs. (A36) to (A39), we have used a similar analysis as in Appendix D of Ref. [6].
b. Finite-key regime
In this case, we need to calculate the sets {Mab} and {Eab}, where Mab is the total number of measurement counts
when Alice (Bob) has used intensity a (b), while Eab is the number of such events that also result in an error. Note
that intensity z is encoded in the Z basis and intensities {w1, w2, v} are encoded in the X basis; we are only interested
in estimating {Mab} and {Eab} when a, b are encoded in the same basis.
For our numerical simulations, we still need to make some assumptions on the obtained measurement results in a
nominal experiment. For this purpose, we use the expected values for relevant parameters using the corresponding
probability in the asymptotic regime. That is, we assume
Mab = NQab and Eab = eabM
ab, (A43)
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where N is the total number of rounds, i.e., the number of transmitted pulses by Alice/Bob, in the protocol, Qab is
the probability of having a successful measurement originating from intensities a, for Alice, and b, for Bob, and eab is
the probability that this measurement results in an error.
To calculate Qab, we first compute the total gain Qtot, using the same procedure as for QZ in the asymptotic case,
with the difference that Qtot is now a function of the average memory-loading probability given by
p¯load =
∑
a
pap
a
load, (A44)
where pa is the probability of selecting intensity a ∈ {z, w1, w2, v}; and paload is the probability of a successful loading
when the user selects intensity a, given by either Eq. (A16) or Eq. (A22), depending on whether intensity a is encoded
in the Z or X basis. Then, we have that
NL =
3− 2p¯load
p¯load(2− p¯load) , (A45)
ηm′ =
(1 + eT/T1 − p¯load)p¯load
(2− p¯load)(eT/T1 + p¯load − 1)ηm, (A46)
Pside =
1
NL +Nr
(A47)
Pmid = Y
MDI
11 (ηm, ηm′), (A48)
Qtot = PsidePmid, (A49)
where Nr = 1 and ηm = ηwηr0ηd. Now, Q
ab is the fraction of Qtot that originated from intensities a, b. Note that
after a successful loading, the state projected to the QM is always a misaligned qubit. The probability that the middle
BSM is successful only depends on the loss coefficients ηm and ηm′ , and it is independent of the intensities a, b that
caused the loading. Thus, Qab only depends on how likely intensities a, b are to cause a successful loading, that is,
Qab = Qtotpapb
paloadp
b
load
p¯2load
. (A50)
For eab, we have that
ezz = e
MDI
11;Z(ηm, η
′
m,E
{
eQMzz
}
), (A51)
eab = e
MDI
11;X
(
ηm, η
′
m,E
{
eQMab
})
, a, b ∈ {w1, w2, v} (A52)
where E
{
eQMab
}
is the total average misalignment error probability between the two QMs, and depends on whether
one considers a dephasing or depolarisation model. The former has no effect on Z-basis states, and therefore
E
{
eQMzz
}
= eQMzz = 2e
z
load(1− ezload). (A53)
For the X-basis intensities, we have that
E
{
eQMab
}
= eaload + e
b
load + βaE {edeph}+ βbE {edeph} − 2ealoadebload − 2βaE {edeph} ebload − 2βbE {edeph} eaload, (A54)
where βk = 1− 2ekload, and
E {edeph} = 1− p¯load
1− (1− p¯load)2 −
p¯2load(1− p¯loade−T/T2)
[1− (1− p¯load)e−T/T2 ][1− (1− p¯load)2] , (A55)
using a similar analysis to the one that results in Eq. (D.8) of [6].
For a depolarisation channel, we have that, for all intensities
E
{
eQMab
}
= eaload + e
b
load + βaE {edepol}+ βbE {edepol} − 2ealoadebload − 2βaE {edepol} ebload − 2βbE {edepol} eaload, (A56)
where
E {edepol} = 2
3
E {edeph} . (A57)
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3. MDI-QKD without QMs
Here, we give the formulas that we have used to simulate the no-memory MDI-QKD with WCP sources.
In general, if Alice and Bob encode in the Z basis and choose intensities a and b, respectively, the gain and error-rate
formulas are given by [29]
Qab = Qc +Qe, (A58)
eab = edQc + (1− ed)Qe, (A59)
where ed represents the total misalignment error probability given by ed = 2emis(1− emis), and
Qc = 2(1− pd)2e−ζ/2(1− (1− pd)e−ηa/2)(1− (1− pd)e−ηb/2)
Qe = 2pd(1− pd)2e−ζ/2[I0(2x)− (1− pd)e−ζ/2]
x = η
√
ab/2
ζ = η(a+ b),
(A60)
where I0 is the modified Bessel function of the first kind and η = ηchηd is the total attenuation between each user
and the middle node. If they encode in the X basis, they are given by [29]
Qab = 2y2[1 + 2y2 − 4yI0(x) + I0(2x)], (A61)
eab =
Qab
2
− (1− 2ed)y2[I0(2x)− 1], (A62)
where
y = (1− pd)e−ζ/4. (A63)
a. Asymptotic regime
In the asymptotic regime, the key rate formula is given by
R ≤ Rs
[
QZ11 (1− h(eph))− fQZh(eZ)
]
. (A64)
QZ and eZ are given by Eqs. (A58) and (A59), respectively, by substituting a = b = z. In the asymptotic regime, we
assume that the users are able to obtain perfect estimates of QZ11 and eph, which are given by
QZ11 = z
2e−2zY11, (A65)
eph = e
MDI
11;X(η, η, ed) =
1
2
− 1
Y11
(1/2− ed)(1− pd)2(1− 2pd)η
2
2
, (A66)
where
Y11 = Y
MDI
11 (η, η) = (1− pd)2
[
η2
2
+ (4η − 3η2)pd + 4(1− η)2p2d
]
. (A67)
b. Finite-key regime
We need to simulate the sets {Mab} and {Eab}. In our simulations, we assume that all measurement counts equal
their expected values, that is,
Mab = NpabQ
ab and Eab = eabM
ab, (A68)
where Qab and eab are given by Eq. (A58) and Eq. (A59) for Z-encoded intensities, and by Eq. (A61) and Eq. (A62)
for X-encoded intensities, and pab is the probability that Alice and Bob choose intensities a and b, respectively.
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Appendix B: Finite-key analysis
In this Appendix, we explain the detailed procedure for finding a lower bound on MZ11 and an upper bound on
eph in Eq. (4). For our finite-key analysis of MDI-QKD and MA-QKD, we use the analytical estimation procedure
introduced in [16], together with the tighter multiplicative Chernoff bounds introduced in [15]. Also, as in [19], we
estimate the total single photon measurement counts M11 in both bases using data in the X basis only. We then
link it with Mzz11 via random sampling analysis. This allows us to encode decoy intensities in the X basis only, thus
wasting fewer rounds for statistical estimation.
1. Background
In the protocol, Alice and Bob emit phase-randomised coherent states of a random intensity a ∈ {z, w1, w2, v},
where the z intensity is encoded in the Z basis and the rest of the intensities are encoded in the X basis. Without
knowing the basis information, the output state corresponding to intensity a can be written as
ρa =
∞∑
n=0
pn|a |n〉〈n| , (B1)
where pn|a is the probability that a pulse of intensity a contains n photons, and |n〉 is the n-photon Fock state. For weak
laser pulses, we can typically assume a Poisson distribution for the photon number, in which case, pn|a = ane−a/n!.
While most of our analysis does not depend on the choice of the probability distribution, we also use the Poisson
assumption for our numerical results. Based on the above diagonal form, for a pulse encoded in a given basis, the
only information available to Eve is its photon number n. This implies that, instead of the actual protocol, Alice and
Bob could have run the equivalent virtual scenario in which
• Alice (Bob) sends a Z-encoded n-photon Fock state with probability pn,Z = pzpn|z.
• Alice (Bob) sends an X-encoded n-photon Fock state with probability pn,X =
∑
a∈{w1,w2,v} papn|a.
In this virtual scenario, Alice and Bob can wait until after Eve’s attack to assign each emission of an X-encoded
n-photon Fock state to intensity a ∈ {w1, w2, v} with probability
pa|n,X =
papn|a
pn,X
, (B2)
and then “reveal” their intensity choices in the appropriate step of the protocol, so that Eve cannot tell which scenario
(actual or virtual) is being performed.
Note that Fock states encoded in different bases are in general partially distinguishable to Eve, so Alice and Bob
must decide their encoding basis before their emission, even in the virtual scenario. There is one important exception,
however: single-photon signals encoded in either the X or Z bases are indistinguishable once averaged by their
selection probabilities, since
ρ1 =
1
2
|H〉〈H|+ 1
2
|V 〉〈V | = 1
2
|D〉〈D|+ 1
2
|A〉〈A| . (B3)
This implies that the users could have replaced their single-photon emissions by the following purification of ρ1
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |H〉+ |1〉 |V 〉) = 1√
2
(|+〉 |D〉+ |−〉 |A〉) , (B4)
where the first qubit, in |0〉-|1〉 basis, is held by the users and |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). This allows us to alter our
virtual scenario in the following way: when Alice and Bob both decide to send a single-photon state, they replace
their respective emissions by the generation of |ψ1〉, and then wait until after Eve’s attack to decide in which basis
to measure their ancilla. This delayed basis choice will allow us to estimate the statistics of Z-encoded single-photon
emissions using X-basis data.
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2. Estimation of MZ11
The estimation is divided in two steps:
1. Estimation of M11, the total single-photon measurement counts in both basis, using the decoy state analysis.
2. Estimation of MZ11 from M11, via a random sampling analysis.
a. Estimation of M11
In our virtual scenario, the users have replaced their decoy-state emissions by Fock states, which are only assigned
to a particular intensity after Eve’s attack. LetMXnm, with (n,m) 6= (1, 1), be the set of rounds in which Alice (Bob)
chooses the X basis, sends n (m) photons, and Charlie reports a successful detection. Also, let MXnm =
∣∣MXnm∣∣. After
her reports, Alice and Bob will assign each event in MXnm to intensities a, b ∈ {w1, w2, v} with probability
pab|nm,X = pa|n,Xpb|m,X =
papn|a
pn,X
pbpm|b
pm,X
, (B5)
where pn,X =
∑
a∈{w1,w2,v} papn|a by the law of total probability. As explained above, Alice and Bob have also
delayed their choice of basis on those rounds in which both sent a single photon. Let M11 be the set of rounds in
which Alice and Bob sends a single photon and Charlie reports a successful detection, and let M11 = |M11|. The
probability that they assign each event in M11 to intensities a, b ∈ {z, w1, w2, v} is
pab|11 = pa|1pb|1 =
pap1|a
p1
pbp1|b
p1
(B6)
where p1 =
∑
a∈{z,w1,w2,v} papn|a by the law of total probability. Let M
ab denote the number of rounds assigned to
intensities a, b ∈ {w1, w2, v}. Its expected value is
E[Mab] = pab|00,XMX00 + pab|01,XM
X
01 + pab|11M11 +
∑
(m,n)∈S
pab|mn,XMXmn, (B7)
where S = {(m,n)|m,n ∈ Z,m, n ≥ 0} − {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}. Each of these intensity assignments is a Bernoulli
random variable, and therefore E[Mab] is the average value of the sum of some Bernoulli random variables. The
values of Mab measured by Alice and Bob correspond to an instance of this sum of Bernoulli random variables.
Let χ =
∑n
i=1 χi be the outcome of the sum of n independent Bernoulli random variables χi ∈ {0, 1}. Given the
observation of the outcome χ, its expectation value E[χ] can be bounded by [15]
EL[χ] =
χ
1 + δL
,
EU[χ] =
χ
1− δU ,
(B8)
except with probability , where δL and δU are the solutions of the equations[
eδ
L
(1 + δL)1+δL
]χ/(1+δL)
=
1
2
ε
[
e−δ
U
(1− δU)1−δU
]χ/(1−δU)
=
1
2
ε.
(B9)
These solutions can be expressed in terms of the Lambert W function, the inverse of f(z) = zez, as follows
δL = W0(−eln(ε/2−χ)/χ)
δU = W−1(−eln(ε/2−χ)/χ),
(B10)
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which is useful for their quick numerical computation.
We use Eq. (B8) to find bounds on E[Mab], which by Eq. (B7) will set constraints on the values of MXnm and M11.
Since we are interested in ML11, our analysis can be reformulated as the optimization problem: Find minM11 such
that
EL[Mab] ≤ pab|00,XMX00 + pab|01,XMX01 + pab|11M11 +
∑
(m,n)∈S
pab|mn,XMXmn ≤ EU[Mab] (B11)
∀a, b ∈ {w1, w2, v}. This problem can be solved using linear optimisation techniques [16]. In this work, however, we
use the computationally faster analytical estimation method laid out in the Supplementary Note 1 of [16], for Poisson
distributed input signals. Note that to use this analytical method, one needs to define the term MˆX11 such that
pab|11M11 = pab|11,XMˆX11, (B12)
where pab|11,X is given by Eq. (B5), and substitute pab|11M11 by pab|11,XMˆX11 in Eq. (B11). Then, one can use the
results of [16] to find a lower bound on MˆX11, and reuse Eq. (B12) to turn it into a lower bound M
L
11 on M11.
b. Estimation of MZ11 from M11
LetMZ11 be the subset ofM11 in which both users employ the Z basis, and let MZ11 =
∣∣MZ11∣∣. By the delayed basis
argument, Alice and Bob could decide which events inM11 belong toMZ11 after Eve’s attack. They assign each event
in M11 to MZ11 with probability
pzz|11 =
(
pzp1|z
p1
)2
. (B13)
Let χ =
∑n
i=1 χi be the outcome of the sum of n independent Bernoulli random variables χi ∈ {0, 1}. Given the
expectation value E[χ], the outcome χ can be lower-bounded by [15]
χ ≥ χL = (1− δ)χ¯
δ =
− ln(ε) +√[ln(ε)]2 − 8 ln(ε)χ¯
2χ¯
,
(B14)
except with probability ε.
The lower bound on MZ11 is then given by (M
Z
11)
L = (1− δ)χ¯, where χ¯ = pzz|11ML11 and δ is given by Eq. (B14).
3. Estimation of eph
The upper bound on eph is given by
eUph =
(EZ11)
U
(MZ11)
L
, (B15)
where EZ11 is the number of phase errors in MZ11, that is, the number of bit errors that Alice and Bob would have
obtained if they had encoded their Z basis single-photon emissions in the X basis. The estimation of this quantity is
divided in two steps:
1. Estimation of E11, the total amount of phase-flip errors in all single-photon emissions.
2. Estimation of EZ11 from E11, via a random sampling analysis.
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a. Estimation of E11
Let us imagine that, in the virtual scenario, Alice and Bob measure all their pairs of ancillas inM11 in the X basis,
even those that they have assigned toMZ11. Let E11 be the subset ofM11 in which they find a phase-flip error, and let
E11 = |E11|. Each event in E11 is assigned to intensity a, b ∈ {z, w1, w2, v} with probability pab|11 defined in Eq. (B6).
Also, let EXnm, with (n,m) 6= (1, 1), be the subset of MXnm in which Alice and Bob obtain a phase-flip error.
Each event in EXnm is assigned to intensity a, b ∈ {w1, w2, v} with probability pab|nm,X defined in Eq. (B5). For
a, b ∈ {w1, w2, v}, the expected value of Eab with respect to these assignments is
E[Eab] = pab|00,XEX00 + pab|01,XE
X
01 + pab|11E11 +
∑
(m,n)∈S
pab|mn,XEXmn. (B16)
From Eqs. (B8)–(B10), we obtain bounds EL[Eab],EU[Eab], and redefine our analysis as the optimization problem:
Find max E11 such that
EL[Eab] ≤ pab|00,XEX00 + pab|01,XEX01 + pab|11E11 +
∑
(m,n)∈S
pab|mn,XEXmn ≤ EU[Eab], (B17)
∀a, b ∈ {w1, w2, v}. Again, this problem can be solved using linear programming techniques, but we use the analytical
estimation method in the Supplementary Note 1 of [16]. Note that to use this analytical method, one needs to define
a term EˆX11 such that
pab|11E11 = pab|11,XEˆX11, (B18)
where pab|11,X is given by Eq. (B5), and substitute pab|11E11 by pab|11,XEˆX11 in Eq. (B17). Then, one can use the
results of [16] to find an upper bound on EˆX11, and reuse Eq. (B18) to turn it into an upper bound E
U
11 on E11.
b. Estimation of EZ11 from E11
By the delayed basis argument, each event in E11 will be assigned to E
Z
11 with probability pzz|11, defined in Eq. (B13).
Let χ =
∑n
i=1 χi be the outcome of the sum of n independent Bernoulli random variables χi ∈ {0, 1}. Given the
expectation value E[χ], the outcome χ can be upper-bounded by [15]
χ ≤ χU = (1 + δ)χ¯
δ =
− ln(ε) +√[ln(ε)]2 − 8 ln(ε)χ¯
2χ¯
,
(B19)
except with probability ε.
Finally, an upper bound on EZ11 is given by (E
Z
11)
U = (1 + δ)χ¯, where χ¯ = pzz|11EU11 and δ is given by Eq. (B19).
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